Vegan Athletes and Weakness?

This topic is completely unrelated to the course material, but I wanted to touch upon it anyways. I was browsing through the link that Dr. Johnson posted of "vegan athletes". As anyone should be, I was very shocked and impressed with the amount of muscle mass, combined with accomplishments, that these people had made. No doubt, I thought it such because of their diets and the lack of meat. However, this started me down another path of thought.

These people are considered somehow especially amazing because of the lack of animals in their diet. Now, I know that most of society considers animals to be an essential part of diet for protein and iron. However, I believe there is research that shows animals do not necessarily need to be consumed for such reasons. In fact, a dinner full of chick peas followed by a peanut butter dessert probably contains more iron than the average piece of steak. So why would we consider these people especially amazing because of diet?

I think this is because the "animal" in all of us subconsciously still views the consumption of animals as a form of dominance. By eating the other flesh, we are asserting that that species is weaker and has been "conquered" by us. Thus, people that don't eat the flesh should also be considered weaker. They are not as "strong" as we are. Not biologically, but maybe mentally?

This might all be way out there, but that's why I leave it up to you to decide. Do we consider vegan/vegetarian athletes to be weaker because of nutrition or because of the subconscious? And if we do it because of the subconscious, do you believe it can be overcome?

Response to Becky

First off, I will say that Becky's entry was masterfully written and nicely thought through. Hence my response to it. I think it continues to pose that ever-looming question that has plagued our readings this week: species over the broad spectrum? Becky takes this one step further in asking if it is possible to abandon such a feeling or desire. And on top of that, is it selfishness to continue to adhere to such a strategy? To the latter, I say it is not possible. And to the other, I say it is not selfish. Allow me to explain.

In all species, from the grasshopper to the human male or female, there is an innate instinct to survive. We have outlined this several times, including how it can be differently expressed across the board. How else would evolution be a functioning theory? Natural selection has worked its way through the years, with things ranging from species to empires fading away. And yet in each case, survival has been the goal. Build a building to last. Train the lion cub to hunt. Raise the child to live a long life. These are all different scenarios, all with the same desire: survival.


You can't beat or train that out of someone. Short of insanity, it's a characteristic bound within all species. Even plant life can be said to adhere to it. But I will not make the Defense of Plants here. Without such an instinct, I don't truly think anything would live on. Evolution would stop and the world would die out. And finally having watched Life After People will have paid off somewhat. But I digress.

I also go out on a limb, but I believe a fairly firm one, when I say that it is not selfish. Rather, I think you have to look at the context of the actions. Kill the dog to save my child and perpetuate the human race? Or bulldoze the swamp to put up a shopping center? Now both are selfish. But only one is selfless. I think the point speaks for itself.

So no, I don't think we can let specie-bias go. In fact, I think we must keep it in order to survive. But I think we must judge every action we take in the terms of the moment. And we must ask ourselves: is this selfish or selfless? There is your true question.

The Species Factor!

Today in class, I kept wanting to say something, but I suppose it would be better served here in the hopes that someone constructively replies to it.

We talked a lot about Singer's Moral Circle, its legitimacy as a theory, and all this stuff. However, I would tend to think that I disagree with the circle because it does not account for one very important thing: species.

Is it not too much to assume that we act the way we do because humans are loyal to humans? Just as a bear would kill a wolf to save another bear, I am certain a human would do the same. Is it wrong to compare these? I do not think so at all. All species have this instinct within that makes them loyal (or sometimes disloyal I suppose) to their own species. When given the choice between theirs or yours, it is often most likely the case that they will choose their own.

Now some might say that this is just a stretch and that I cannot place this generalization to mean the same thing for all species. I would respond that they are incorrect and I would base it on Donovan. She asserts that all species are equal. Regardless of whether you agree, it is the assertion. Therefore, we must attribute some sort of likeness to all species. And I believe that "species" in and of itself defines the characteristic that I am pointing out.

So I ask this question: can species bias be attributed to all species? Or do some species not possess such an ability? It puzzles me.

A Response to Kelsey...

From what I was able to deduce, Kelsey questioned the validity of punishing animals for committing "wrong" acts. She asked whether or not it was okay for us, as humans AND moral agents, to set the "going rate" for punishment of a particular animal.

I found the question and idea intriguing, because it puts into question Regan's notion that animals are "moral patients" while humans represent the "moral agents". I would tend to disagree with Regan and possibly with Kelsey, if the assertion is that animals have no sense of right and wrong, so we must define it for them. I personally think that the whole "moral agents .v. moral patients" argument is full of wholes, but I digress.

To answer Kelsey's question, I would say that yes, we humans must set moral standards for animals and apply them as we see fit. Does this mean that animals have no sense of right or wrong action? Not at all. In contrast, they might see something that is wrong to us as right to them. For example, a female dog has just had a litter of puppies. She plays a bit rough with them at times and carries them about in her mouth. Now, imagine there is a newborn baby in the same house as the new mother dog. How would the dog be able to differentiate between the way it treats its young and treating the baby? No doubt the humans would scold, if not remove entirely, the dog for such behavior that in its world is only normal.

So yes, I believe it is right to subscribe our moral guidance to animals. You could almost consider me an adherent to Donovan's theory of an equal playing field, with a few minor rules that change from game to game.

The Miniride Principle?

While reading Regan, something struck me as odd: the concept of the miniride principle.

Regan basically states that the miniride principle means that every moral agent or patient has their own prima facie right. This basically means that my rights are no greater than the rights of the person sitting behind me or behind me at this very moment. Thus, when presented with the choice to violate one or all of our rights, a person must choose to violate only one. Our rights are all equal and so one must take the "miniride", so as to avoid hurting the most minimal of rights.

Now I'm sure the whole conversation above seems trite and choppy, but bear with me. My confusion with the whole thing is rather quite simple. Regan states that the miniride principle maintains a sort of "egalitarianism" by making all our rights equal and thus asking for the smallest amounts of rights to be violated. But aha! Therein lies the contradiction and my contest of the idea: wouldn't it be more equal to violate the whole?

If one violates the rights of the whole group, then all rights have truly been considered equally and dealt with accordingly. To violate one or a few persons instead of the whole seems more segregated than anything.

Maybe I have simply misinterpreted Regan, so I ask for comments in any way to discuss or clear the air.